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Esta tese de mestrado tenta estabelecer una relação entre a banca de relação e
a estrutura de capitais das pequenas e médias empresas (PMEs) Portuguesas, nos
anos de 2006, 2008 e 2015. Apesar de ja existirem bastantes estudos sobre a relação
entre assimetria de informação e monitorização delegada, a relação entre estes dois
conceitos e a estrutura de capitais nestes últimos anos não tem sido alvo de tantos
estudos. Assim sendo, com este trabalho pretendemos perceber de que modo é que
a banca de relação, através de informação privada (assimetria de informação) obtida
através da monitorização delegada pode influenciar as decisões de financiamento
das PMEs Portuguesas. Para podermos realizar este estudo temos de tentar repon-
der à seguinte questão: Qual é o impacto da banca de relação na estrutura de capitais
das PMEs em Portugal?
Palavras-chave: Banca de relação, Monitorização delegada, Assimetria de infor-




This master thesis examines the influence of the of relationship banking in the
capital structure of Portuguese small and medium enterprises (SMEs), in the years
of 2006, 2008 and 2015. Although, the relation between delegated monitoring and
asymmetric information has been subject of many studies, the relation between this
two concepts and the capital structure of a firm has rarely studied. Our work will
be focus in understanding who does relationship lending influences financing de-
cisions of SMEs, by exploring inside information (due to asymmetric information
between financial intermediaries) that came fromdelegatedmonitoring activities. In
order to do se, we try to answer the following research question: What is the impact
of relationship lending in the capital structure and financing decisions on SMEs in
Portugal?
Key-words: Relationship lending, Delegated monitoring, Asymmetry of informa-
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1.1 Purpose and Research Questions
This master thesis examines the influence of relationship lending in the capital
structure and the financing decisions of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in
Portugal1. To better understand the importance of SMEs to the European and Por-
tuguese economywe first need to look to some statistical facts about them. In Europe
SMEs represent 99.8% of all enterprises, 57.4% of value added and 66.8% of the total
work force.
Since my thesis is based in Portuguese SMEs, we must understand why SMEs
are important for the Portuguese economy. SMEs have a big responsibility in the
development of countries, since they usually have a very high weight in the growth
of the gross domestic product (GDP). In Portugal SMEs are responsible for 99.9% of
all enterprises, 69.0% of value added and finally they form 78.0% of the total jobs
(Muller, Devnani, Gagliardi, & Marzocchi, 2016).
With such an importance to the economy it is very useful to understand how
financial decisions are made, how firms finance their investment projects and how is
capital structure affected by the financing decisions made by the owner-managers.
Our work will be focus in understanding who does relationship lending influences
1SME definition by the European commission: enterprises with less than 250 employees and a
turnover smaller than EUR 50million and/or their balance sheet total is smaller than EUR 43million.
1
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financing decisions of SMEs, by exploring inside information (due to asymmetric
information between financial intermediaries) that came from delegated monitoring
activities.
We will try to attend the following research question: What is the impact of
relationship lending in the capital structure and financing decisions on SMEs in
Portugal?
1.2 Document Structure
Thedocument is divided in 5 chapters. Thefirst chapter is the introduction,wherewe
establish the importance of SMEs to the European economy and we also define our
researchquestion. In the "LiteratureReviewandProposedModel" chapter the author
review the relevant literature about delegated monitoring, asymmetric information,
the costs of relationship lending, relation between relationship banking and SMEs
financing, determinants of capital structure in SMEs and finally the proposedmodel.
In chapter three we present the data and the methodology used in order to test the
hypothesis. On chapter four we find the empirical results of our model and finally
in chapter five we find the conclusions that we may take from this study.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This thesis focuses on the relationship lending and the financing decisions of small
and medium enterprises. In order to establish a relationship between the two we
first need to understand what is the role of banks in the society, mainly through
delegated monitoring and second what is the importance of relationship lending in
the financing of SMEs, and finally what is the impact of this relation in the capital
structure of SMEs.
2.1 Delegated Monitoring:
Diamond (1984) developed a theory of financial intermediation based on the mini-
mum cost production of information that is useful to understand and resolve incen-
tives problems. According to Diamond (1984) a financial intermediary (a bank as
an example) is delegated the task of costly monitoring loan contracts written with
firms who borrow from it. Financial intermediaries have a gross cost advantage in
collecting this information since the alternative is either the duplication of efforts
if each lender monitors directly or a free-rider problem, in which case there is no
monitoring by lenders. However, Diamond (1984) was not the first author to assign
the "delegated monitoring" to banks. Schumpeter (1939) affirms that:
" ...bank must not only know what the transaction is which he is asked to finance and
3
Relationship Lending and Financing of SMEs in Portugal Msc Dissertation
how it is likely to turn out but he must also know the costumer, his business and even his
private habits, and get, by "talking things over with him", a clear picture of the situation."
(Schumpeter, 1939)
Diamond theory analyses the determinants of delegation costs, and develops a
model in which the intermediary has a net cost advantage relative to direct lend-
ing and borrowing. In his model Diamond argues that diversification is key to a
possible net advantage of intermediation, since there is a strong similarity between
the relation of an individual lender and the borrower and the relation between an
intermediary and its depositors. Diamond model relates two theories. The first, is
the principal agent theory, where themonitoring of additional information about the
agent can solve moral hazard problems. The second theory, is the theory of finan-
cial intermediation based on imperfect information, where an ex-post information
asymmetry between lenders and entrepreneurs, who need to raise capital for a risky
project, may lead to an adverse selection problem.
With this in mind, Diamond (1984) assumes a world where debt is shown to
be the optimal contract between lender and entrepreneur. Due to wealth constraint
the entrepreneurs cannot have a negative consumption. The contract in which they
enter, to raise funds, will have some cost, if there is no monitoring and lenders may
observe the final outcome of the investment. In the case of a negative net present
value (NPV) the entrepreneur will have a non-pecuniary bankruptcy cost. As an
alternative to incurring in these costs, it is possible for lenders (who contract di-
rectly with entrepreneurs) to spend some resources in monitoring the data which
the entrepreneur observes. Between these two type of costs, non-pecuniary and
monitoring, the less expensive of the two will be optimal. However, there is a third
type of contract, delegated monitoring. This contract appears when direct monitor-
ing is not viable, since with too many investors monitoring can be a very expensive
activity. To overcome this problem investors may delegate this activity to a third
party or to one of the investors. To better understand this idea lets assume that
there are m outside security holders in a firm and it costs, to each on of the holders,
K > 0 to monitor. The total cost of monitoring will be K ·m. This will imply either
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a very large expenditure on monitoring costs or a free rider problem. The solution
proposed byDiamond requires that security holders should delegate themonitoring
to a few security holders, or to an outsider player (a bank as an example).
Banks as providers of monitoring services
A simple model of firm borrowing and delegated monitoring by a financial inter-
mediary: (Diamond, 1984)
The model assumes a world where there are N risk neutral entrepreneurs that
are endowed with the technology for an invisible project that has stochastic returns.
The projects need an investment of 1 unit, which is higher than the wealth of the
entrepreneur, and will produce an output in one period where E[r] > R1. Finally,
there are m lenders and each one as available a wealth of 1/m. Since we are in
the presence of a competitive capital market, if an entrepreneur project has a return
higher than R (R/m for each lender) investors will make the loan.
As was previously said, if the lender has the ability to observe the outcome of
the investment made by the entrepreneur we can define three type of contracts. In
the first one, there is no monitoring. However, there is a non-pecuniary bankruptcy
penalty (φ), which represents a cost in the case of the failure of the project.
The secondonehappenswhen each of them lenders spend resourcesmonitoring
the outcome of the project. However, this type of contract will only be efficient if
there is a small number of investors. If there was only one lender in the economy
the cost of directly monitoring would need to be smaller than the non-pecuniary
penalty without monitoring (K ≤ Eỹ[φ× (ỹ)]). When we introduce many lenders
monitoring is only valuable if and only if the total cost of monitoring is smaller than
the value of the non-pecuniary penalty without monitoring (m · K ≥ Eỹ[φ · (ỹ)]).
When m is larger this condition is unlikely because each lender’s loan is smaller.
Even if the condition is satisfied it implies a very large expenditure in monitoring,
and in this case some sort of delegated monitoring might be desirable. Which takes
1Where R is the competitive interest rate of the economy, the project would be undertaken if the
risk neutral entrepreneur had the available capital
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us too the third one.
In this type of contract lenders will delegate the monitoring to somemonitoring
agents (in our case financial intermediaries). Diamond (1984) assumes that the
actions taken by the monitor can not be directly observed by the lender. This means
that lenders need to provide incentives to the delegated monitor to monitor and
enforce the contract. With this type of contract the total cost of delegatedmonitoring
is equal to the cost of monitoring, k, plus the expected cost of providing incentives
to the monitor, which we call the cost of delegation and denote the cost per project
by D. With this in mind the lender will only choose to delegate monitoring if and
only if the total cost of monitoring is inferior too the cost of the other two contracts
(K + D ≤ min(m · K; Eỹ[φ× (ỹ)])).
With his paperwe conclude that financial intermediaries allow a better contracts
to be used and allow pareto superior allocations. This provides a positive role for
financial intermediaries.
2.2 Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Im-
plicit Contracts
Sharpe (1990) argues that customer relationship is a consequence of asymmetric
information. However, in Sharpe’s argument asymmetric information arises in the
same side of themarket and not between sides. In other words, asymmetric informa-
tion arises between lenders or borrowers and not between lenders and borrowers.
By exploit the presumptions made by Kane and Malkiel (1965) and Fama (1985),
that when a bank lends to a firm learns more about that borrower’s characteristics
than other banks, Sharpe (1990) was able to argue that the asymmetric evolution of
information will lead to a potential ex-post monopoly power. A monopoly power
has undesirable effects on the allocation of capital, since it is relatively costly for
banks and firms to write multiple periods contingent contracts. Even though banks
earn a zero expected profit over the lifespan of the average costumer relationship,
they are not disciplined by the market to offer better performing customers "com-
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petitive" rates and can expect to earn economic profit on those costumers. Due to
competition, rents are washed away via lower interest rates on loans offered to all
firms in their initial period, precisely when banks know the least about the firm. As
a result low quality firms employ a greater proportion of capital than in a standard
symmetric information system. Sharpe (1990) suggests that firms stay with the same
bank not because they are treated particularly well, but because high quality firms
are "informationally capture". Their bankmakes the best offer, but this only happens
due to the difficulty that firms have to convince other banks about their superior
performance. Adverse selection makes it difficult for one bank to draw a customer
from another bank without attracting the less desirable.
Sharpe (1990) concludes that a bank charges prices that exceed its marginal cost
of funds, even though there is no asymmetric information concerning its product.
Rather than moral hazard, it is the potential for taking advantage of captive cus-
tomers, by altering the terms of trade, that gives rise to a reputation equilibrium
where competitors earn rents over time.
The Model:
A. Firms
Sharpe (1990) assumes that there are M risk-neutral entrepreneurs seeking fund-
ing for their projects. It is assumed that they will carry out the investment for a two
periods. For a given firm, the one-period gross return is identical and independent
distributed (i.i.d). In other words, assumes that returns only depend on the quality
of the firm, meaning that the returns vary across firms. Another important assump-
tion is that the returns follow a binary distribution, meaning that the success of the
project is independent from the size of the investment. A firm of type q, that invests
I units of capital, earns a gross return of:
g(I) · I with probability pq,
0 with probability 1− pq.
(2.1)
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Equations (2.1) are the gross return of the investment project of firm q. Although
the results can be generalised to a market with many types, for simplification it is




, with PH > PL. Thus, there are two types of firms, high
(H) and low (L) quality, where the quality is directly related with the probability of
success. Let θ be the fraction of firms that are high quality, θ · M is the aggregate
measure of high quality firms. In contrast with the majority of asymmetric informa-
tion literature Sharpe (1990) assumes that firms only know the distribution of types
and not their own. While this assumption seems to be in conflict with the standard
assumption of information asymmetry, the difference can really be seen as one em-
phasis. It is surely the case that, in the process of running a firm, an entrepreneur
(and perhaps the financial intermediary) garners new information about his ability
to carry out projects.
Entrepreneurs are assumed to immediately consume any net profit earned on
first-period projects. Thus, they generate no additional collateral for subsequent
operations. While unrealistic, the purpose of this assumption is straightforward.
Sharpe developed a simple model in which a firm’s cost of capital varies over time
according with the information available, arising from the firms past performance,
to the financial intermediary.
B. Loan Supply and the Information Structure
Sharpe (1990) assumes a world where firms own no capital and are only able to
raise funds by borrowing from one of the M banks of the economy in a "competitive"
bank loanmarket. It is also assumed that each bank as access to an unlimited amount
of capital at a cost r̃ 2per period.
Like firms, banks are unable to observe firm’s quality and at the beginning of the
first period, they only know θ, the proportion of high quality firms in the economy.
It is also assumed that, when a bank lends capital to a firm, it has the ability to




be the perfect signal of
the outcome of firm’s f ’s project in period one, where γ = S if the project is success
2More generally r̃ could be interpreted as the competitive interest rate of the economy. If the
project, had an E[r] ≥ r̃,the firm would undertaken the project if it had the available capital
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and γ = F if the project fails. Banks that did not lend to firm f in the first period can




. This information may
be observe by the actual lender. Its conditional distribution is given by:
prob(γ̃ = S̃|S) = prob(γ̃ = F̃|F) = (1 + φ)/2,
prob(γ̃ = S̃|F) = prob(γ̃ = F̃|S) = (1 + φ)/2,
(2.2)
where φ ∈ [0, 1]. Finally it is also assumed that the signal γ̃ is fixed for any
particular firm. All the outside banks observe the same signal from the firm and
they do it without cost. Thus, in one extreme, if φ = 0, outside banks learn nothing
about the firm’s past performance and, at the other extreme, if φ = 1, outside banks
learn the same as the inside bank. Implicit in the assumption of asymmetric out-
come observability is the idea that the lender must expend some minimum level of
resources to make sure that the borrower is doing what it has promised, i.e, that it is
not taking unnecessary risk or wasting capital via (Diamond, 1984). In the process
of monitoring lenders learn more about the success of the firm’s operation than do
outside banks. As a result, the original lender should be in a better position to
evaluate the firm future performance. Furthermore, banks do not unveil informa-
tion concerning profitability of their commercial clients. Clearly such information
sharing would help competing banks to bid away their best customers.
Equilibrium Loan Contracts
We now examine the temporal pattern of equilibrium loan rates faced by firms
in each of the two regimes. In one, two period contingent contracts are assumed to be
enforced; in the other, pre-commitments on the terms of the second-period contract
are assumed to be unenforceable. In either regime, was assume that contract offers
are built from standard single-period debt contracts. A single-period debt contract
consists of an interest rate offer, rj( f ), and a corresponding repayment schedule,
João Teodorico Pinto Leite Braamcamp de Figueiredo 9
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I · [1 + rj( f )] if γ( f ) = S.
0 if γ( f ) = F.
(2.3)
where I is the size of the loan chosen by the firm. A two-period contract will
consist in the interest rate of the one-period loan plus a commitment on the terms of
the two-period loan, that commitment being contingent on the firm performance in
the first period.
A firm facing an interest rate of r in a given period chooses the investment level
which solves
maxI = [g(I)− (1 + r)]I · pe( f ) (2.4)
where pe( f ) represents the expected probability of success of a certain firm. The
first-order condition that yields the implicit investment level is:
I∗ = −[g(I∗)− (1 + r)]/g′(I∗) (2.5)
Given our assumption in (2.1), it can easily be verify that the second order
condition holds and that both, investment and profit, are decreasing functions of the
interest rate. On the other hand, the investment level is independent of the firm’s
expected probability of success.
The first thing to do before describing the equilibrium is to determine the break-
even interest rate of the banks. To do so, a bank must have at least the same rate
of return, upon the probability of success, that it would have if it invested in a
competitive market, r̃:
(1 + r̃) = pe · (1 + r)





João Teodorico Pinto Leite Braamcamp de Figueiredo 10
Chapter 2. Literature Review Msc Dissertation
Let rp denotes the break-even loan rate for a loan made to a randomly selected
firm in thefirst period. In this case, pe = p = [θ · ph +(1− θ) · pl], is theunconditional
probability of success. However banks are more concerned in determining the
conditional break-even interest rate upon the success of the firm in the first period,
rs. This interest rate, rs, is given by equation (2.6) for:
pe = p(S) = ph · prob(H|S) + pl · (1− prob(H|S)) (2.7)
and,
prob(H|S) = θ·php (2.8)
In the case of a firm that has failed in the first-period we have that the interest rate
that break-even the loan made by the bank is given by equation (2.6) but, instead
of replacing pe by p(S) we replace by p(F) (the conditional probability of success
in the second period conditional on failure in the first period). These interest rates
(rp, rS, rF) are called the "standard competitive rates" since these rates would prevail
if all the banks could observe all projects outcomes.
Sharpe (1990) similarly characterised the break-even rates based in the obser-
vation of the signal that firms gave to the outsiders banks in the first period of
investment. For a randomly selected firm with γ̃( f ) = S̃ the condition probability
of and the break-even loan rate are define as p(S̃) and rS̃, where:





Finally, for a randomly selected firm with γ̃( f ) = F̃ the conditional probability of
success and the break-even loan rate, upon the bad signal that the firm gave to
outsiders banks, is define as p(F̃) and rF̃.
3where pe is the bank expected probability of success of the firm
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It is easy to verify and intuitive that p(S) > p(S̃) > p > p(F̃) > p(F), and
consequently that, rS < rS̃ < r < rF̃ < rF. Furthermore, as φ converges to one, this
means that the signal is becoming more accurate, rS̃ and rF̃ converge to rS and rF,
respectively. (Sharpe, 1990)
According with the main theoretical thought, banks reduce the agency costs of
lending to small and medium growth firms in various ways. However, in practice,
many of the these firms try to diversify their financing even if banks are willing to
lendmore. Rajan (1992) argues that while the benefits of bank financing are well un-
derstood the costs are not. While informed banks make flexible financing decisions,
that prevents firms to take bad projects, the costs associated with this role are the
bigger bargaining power of banks over the projects profit, once the project begun.
Thus, the firm’s choice of borrowing sources, and the choice of priority for its debts
claims, attempt to optimally circumscribe the powers of banks. With hismodel Rajan
(1992) justifies the coexistence of banks and financial markets. Rajan (1992) argues
that the ex post allocation of property rights will determine some ex ante incentives.
However, he divides this property rights in two separated types, the surplus and
the control rights. Since both of them are aspects of the bank’s information-based
implicit property rights, they tend to vary similarly with a lot of factors.
Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) are very similar papers, however they havemany
and important differences. While Sharpe (1990) restricts his analysis to examine the
costs of the inside bank, Rajan (1992) explores the benefits of the inside bank’s control.
Rajan (1992) shows that changes in the allocation of priority, in general, do not alter
the inside bank’s rents. Nevertheless, changes in the priority may alter the bank’s
control and indirectly affect the owner’s incentives to exert effort. Sharpe (1990) also
analyses the role of implicit contracts in reducing the bank’s incentives to extract
rents, while Rajan (1992) the amount of borrowing from different sources and the
allocation of priority as factors that changes the ability of banks to extract rents as
well as their ability to control the firm.
Rajan (1992) has two contributions to the theory. The first one is to highlights the
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cost of bank’s finance that stems endogenously from the monitoring and controlling
functions that the bank performs. The second contribution is that, maturity, source
and priority affect both the benefits and costs of bank debt.
The Model:
Rajan (1992) developed a model that is divided in four parts (the firm/project,
the financiers, information and finally the contracts). Those parts define the charac-
teristics of the model. With respect to the project Rajan (1992) describes an economy
with a single owner-managed firm, with a project idea, the project lives for two pe-
riods. In the initial date 0 the project requires an initial investment of I. The owner
then expends a personal effort β at a unit cost of 1. This personal effort (β) along side
with an exogenous quality parameter (θ) will affect the probability (q(β; θ)) of the
good state (G) to occur. At date 1, there are two possibilities, the good state, G, with
probability q(β; θ) and the bad state, B, with probability (1− q(β; θ)). In this date the
assets purchased at date 0 can be liquidated for a value L where L ≤ I. At date 2, in
the good state the projects pays out X with probability 1. While in the bad state the
project will pay out X with probability pB and zero with probability (1− pB), and
the assets are depreciate to zero. Rajan (1992) also assumes that X > I ≥ L > pbX
and that q(β; θ) as the following properties:
q1(β; θ) > 0, q11(β; θ) < 0, q2(β; θ) > 0 (A1)
q1(0; β) = 1/ε, q1(x; θ) = 0 (A2)
q12(β; θ) = 0 (A3)
Assumption (A1) state that the probability of the good state being realized is in-
creasing and concave in the effort of the owner, β, and is increasing in the quality, θ.
Assumption (A2) states that the marginal benefit of the effort decreases to zero from
a large number. Assumption (A3) is a separability assumption.
In summary, if the owner invests at date 0:
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Regarding financiers Rajan (1992) assumes that we are in a risk-neutral world
and the risk-less interest rate is zero. The owner has no money of their own and
must borrow it to finance the project. There are two type of lenders (banks and
financial markets) in a competitive credit market. As we are interest in finding what
is the impact of relationship lending in the finance of small and medium enterprises
we will only take into account the banking type of debt, since SMEs usually do not
have access to financial markets. In this world banks enter the market at each date
to acquire information and make loans. If a bank makes a loan to a firm at date 0,
it gains the access to the internal records of the firm. During this period, the bank
monitors the firm’s boks and the accounts that the firm maintains with the bank.
Much of the information acquired in this way is "soft" in nature. This means that
it is not credible to communicate to the outsiders even if the firm wants to do so.
Therefore banks acquire information only by lending, which is consistent with the
empirical evidence in Lummer and McConnell (1989). Rajan (1992) assumes, for
simplicity that monitoring costs are negligible (Rajan, 1992).
Rajan (1992), as well as Sharpe (1990), assumes that everyone knowns the quality,
θ, at date 0. Once the project begins only the owner knows the effort, β, made and
also knows the state at date 1 before deciding whether to continue or to stop de
project. The inside bank learns the effort provided and the state at the same time
as the owner. Regarding the contracts Rajan (1992) assumes that they can not be
contingent on the liquidation decision, effort or the state. He also does not allow
contracts in which the required payment under any circumstance is less than the
amount borrowed; Di,j < Ai.
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The Basic Trade-Off
The borrower decides (i) what type of lender to approach to borrow; (ii) what
effort level, β to exert and after contracting (iii) whether to liquidate or to continue
the project after seeing the state at date 1. The lender decides (i) the contract terms
offered at date 0 and (ii) whether to renegotiate, cut off credit, continue with the old
contract or offer a new contract at date 1.
First-Best Solution
If the entrepreneur manges to raise capital to invest in the project, at date 1
the owner should liquidate the project in the bad state and he should continue the
project in the good state. Thus having an expect surplus of:
E[Surplus] = q(β; θ)(X− I)− (1− q(β; θ))(I − L)− β (2.11)
In equation (2.11) the first term is the surplus in the good state, the second terms is
the depreciation of the assets in the bad state and finally the third term is the cost of
effort. The project will only be financed if the surplus is positive for some effort of
level. Since the effort is the only variable that can be changed and that may influence
the probability of the good state to occur, the owner will choose an effort level that
maximize the expected value of the surplus. The effort βFB, which maximises this
surplus is obtain by solving the first-order condition (FOC):
∂E[Surplus]
∂β = 0
q′(β; θ)(X− I) + q′(β; θ)(I − L)− 1 = 0
q′(β; θ)(X− I + I − L) = 1




Assumptions A1 and A2 ensure the existence and uniqueness of the solution.
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A contract that approaches first-best has to follow two features: First, the owner
must have an incentive to liquidate the project in a bad state scenario. Second, the
owner should obtain all the surplus in the good state and face all the losses in the
bad state. However it is impossible for a contract to have both this objectives.
Rajan throughout his paper repeatedly uses the following ideas:
1. Given limited liability, the owner will never liquidate in the bad state unless
refused credit or bribed;
2. The competitive date 0 market for credit and lenders individual rationality
together imply that loans are zero NPV projects.
Bank Contracts
Short-Term Bank Contracts
The owner borrows I at date 0. At date 1, if we are in the bad state the bank
demand the liquidation of the project and will receive L. Otherwise, if we are in the
good state the contract, that was stablished at date 0, does not oblige the bank to
lend. Instead, the bank can use his discretion to hold up the owner and demand a
share of the surplus in exchange for the funds needed to continue the project. Let µ
(µ ∈ [0; 1]) be the share of unallocated surplus that the owner gets after bargaining.
The expected surplus of the owner will be
E[Surplus] = q(β; θ)µ(X− I)− (1− q(β; θ))µ(I − L)− β (2.13)
The owner will choose an effort level, β that maximises the expected value of the
surplus. The effort βsb, which maximises this surplus is obtain by solving the first-
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q′(β; θ)µ(X− I) + q′(β; θ)µ(I − L)− 1 = 0
q′(β; θ)µ(X− I + I − L) = 1
q1(β; θ) = 1µ(X−L)
(2.14)
for β = β∗sb, provided it is individually rational for the bank to lend:
[1− I−Lq∗sb(X−L) ]− µ ≥ 0
(2.15)
This condition only states that the bank makes a nonnegative profit from lending. If
µ is very high, close to 1, the bank will not be able to recover the depreciation losses.
However, if µ is very low, close to 0, the owner will not have the proper incentives
to exert much effort. In either of these two extreme cases it will not be rational for
the bank to lend the money. In this scenario the firm could be better with a arm’s
length debt contract. However, for intermediate values of µ the bank will lend. But,
comparing equation (2.14) and (2.12), and using the monotonicity and concavity of
q, there will be an insufficient level of effort compared with the first-best solution.
The short-term contract described by Rajan (1992) requires a payment at date
1. This condition works well in the case of a bad state. Since the bank may cut off
credit, receiving L. However, in the case of a good state, where the bank should
continue to lend, the contract has to be renegotiated with resulting distortions to the
firm’s incentives for effort4.
Long-Term Bank Contracts
The bank lends I in a long-term contract, so that at date 1 the loan is renewed
automatically and at date 2 the required repayment is D02b. In the good state
4The first best solution may be achievable if we constrain the bargaining sufficiently by means of
an external non renegotiable mechanism
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scenario the optimal decision is to continue the project. Since, the surplus of the
project is fully allocated by the initial contract there is no renegotiation. Otherwise,
if we are in the bad state, it would be efficient to close down the project. As the
bank can not unilaterally do so, the contracts needs to be renegotiated. The surplus
that they get if the owner chooses the efficient way is L − pBX. The owner gets
pB(X−D02b) + µ(L− pBX)while the lender gets pBD02b + (1− µ)(L− pBX) in the
bad state. The first term in both of the equations is the amount allocated by the








The left side of the equality is the face value of the loan in order to break-even. The
inequality requires that the project return be enough to meet in the good state. The
face value increases with the bargaining power of the owner for two reasons. The
first one states that the bank gets less surplus in the bad state and the second one
shows that, an increase of the owner’s share in the bad state will reduce the incentive
to exert effort to avoid the state, thereby reducing q∗Lb.
2.3 The Costs of Relationship Lending
Relationship lending brings two major problems, the soft-budget constrain and the
hold-up problem (Boot, 2000). Regarding the soft-budget constrain the main issue is
to understand if a bank can credibly deny additional credit to a firmwhen problems
arise. In other words, the soft-budget constrain problem rises when a borrower in
the edge of defaulting, due to financial problems, will try to rise funds near his bank
in an attempt to forestall default. If the firm attempts to rise funds in new financial
institution the firm will not be able to rise the capital. However, if the bank has
already loaned money to the firm may well decide to extend further credit in order
to recover its previous loan. The main problem with this situation is that borrowers
realise that they can renegotiate their contracts ex post. This may have perverse
incentives in the effort level made by the firm. This means that, if the renegotiation
of loans is too easy, a borrower may exert insufficient effort in preventing a bad
outcome from happening.
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The next issue is the hold-up problem, possibly another dark side of relationship
lending. This problem is related with the information monopoly that banks gain
while monitoring the firms which they lend money. In this way, banks could charge
(ex post) high loan interest rates (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992).
For a better understanding we now present a model to illustrate the effects of the
hold-up costs. In this model we will consider an economy with two periods and
a zero interest rate. Firms have an investment opportunity that requires one unit
of investment at the beginning of each period and returns y1 and y2 at the end of
each period. This project can be successful with probability q and unsuccessful with
probability (1− q). In this economy there are also financial intermediaries that are
willing to provide the unit of capital that firms need to invest. However they have
some market power, so they only borrow the capital if the gross expected return
ρ > 1 (ρ = 1 corresponds to competitive case). In the first interaction with the firm
bankswill need to expend an one timemonitoring cost (M). If the firm takes a second
loan in the same bank there is no need for the bank to occur in the duplication of
this cost. However, if the firm in the second period chooses another bank there will
be a duplications of costs since, the second bank will expend the monitoring costs
again. This implies that the first bank will have an information advantage regarding
the remains. The firm will repay R1 in the first period and R2 in the second period.
The bank will invest (1 + M) in the first period and if the firm is successful the bank
will invest another unit of capital in the firm. Otherwise the bank will not finance





0 0(1− q) (1− q)
João Teodorico Pinto Leite Braamcamp de Figueiredo 19
Relationship Lending and Financing of SMEs in Portugal Msc Dissertation
The bank expected outlay is ((1 + M) + q). Ex ante competition implies that all
banks obtain the same return of their ρ funds; that is:
ρ(1 + M + q) = (qR1 + (1− q)0) + q(qR2 + (1− q)0)
ρ(1 + M + q) = qR1 + q(qR2)
ρ(1 + M + q) = qR1 + q2R2
(2.17)
If we assume competition at date 1, i.e. if the firm can switch to another bank, it will
have to repay





Equation (2.18) is also the optimal solution to the incumbent bank.
If we replace R2 in equation (2.17) we get that:
ρ(1 + M + q) = qR1 + q2R2
ρ(1 + M + q) = qR1 + q2(
ρ(1+M)
q )
ρ(1 + M + q) = qR1 + q(ρ(1 + M))
qR1 = ρ[(1 + M + q)− q(1 + M)]
qR1 = ρ[1 + M + q− q− qM]








q < R2 =
ρ(1+M)
q (2.20)
This result shows that the bank uses its monopoly power during the second period,
while competition between banks decreases the rates in the initial stage of the re-
lationship. In general the holdup situation generates a cost for the firm, but it also
implies in this context that banks will finance more risky firms because they will ask
for a lower first repayment at the initial stage of the project (Rajan, 1992).
Alternatively firms may opt for multiple bank relationships since, with several
bank relationships a firms might reduce the holdup problem, but worsen the avail-
ability of credit. One explanation is that multiple relations may reduce the value
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of information since, no bank has an information monopoly regarding the others.
The reduce value of information may cause to much ex post competition which may
discourage the lending to "young" firms. Von Thadden (1995) shows that a long-
term line of credit with a termination clause can balance the costs and benefits of
the hold-up problems and the effects of ex post competition. However, Von Thadden
specifies that the credit will only continue with prespecified terms. The existence of
theses clauses gives the lender a limited bargaining power. In this way, the severity
of the hold-up problemmay be optimally managed and multiple bank relationships
may not be needed (Boot, 2000).
2.4 Relationship Lending and SMEs Financing
It is important to state that for the majority of small firms the external finance is
strictly limited to the private debt and equity markets.
The financing of projects in small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is a very
sensitive issue. Small firms with opportunities to invest in positive net present value
projects may be blocked because potential providers of external finance can not see if
the firm has access to a quality project (adverse selection problem) or ensure that the
funds will not be diverted to fund alternative project (moral hazard problem). This
problem rises because SMEs are very often informationally opaque. To overcome
this problem, finance providers may use relationship lending technologies to reduce
the information asymmetry and also to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection
problems (Berger & Udell, 2002). Under this technique banks acquire information
over time through contact with the firm stakeholders and use this information in
their decisions about the availability and terms of credit to the firm.
In literature, it is generally left unspecificwhether it is the bank firm relationship
or the loan officer firm’s owner relationship who acquires and stores the relationship
information and how this information may be disseminated within the bank. The
information collected by this technic is often ’soft’ data, such as the information
about character and reliability of the firm’s owner and may be difficult to quantify,
verify and communicate through the normal transmission channels of a banking or-
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ganisation. Under relationship lending, the lender bases his decisions in substantial
part on proprietary information about the firm’s owner gather through a variety of
contacts over time (Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Berger & Udell, 1995; Bhattacharya &
Chiesa, 1995). The property information is collected via loans, deposits and other
financial products. Additional information is gathered with the help of the remain
stakeholders (eg, suppliers and customers) who may give some information about
the business environment in which they operate. This information will help the fi-
nancial intermediary to deal with information opacity problems provided by SMEs
(Berger & Udell, 2002; Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Berger & Udell, 1995).
Empirical research shows that the strength of the relationship may affect the
pricing and the availability of credit. In more traditional empirical research the
strength of the relationship is measured in terms of its temporal length, that is, the
amount of time banks have provided some kind of service (eg, loans, deposits or
other type of service). However in more recent literature the strength of the relation-
ship may be measure in terms of the bank providing multiple services, getting the
exclusivity of the relationship, this implies being the only provider of bank loans to
the firm and finally the degree ofmutual trust between the firm and the bank (Berger
& Udell, 2002; Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Berger & Udell, 1995). Empirical studies have
showed that stronger relationships are associated with lower interest rates, reduced
collateral requirements, increased credit availability and a lower dependence on
trade debt, which gives protection against the interest rate cycle (Berger & Udell,
2002; Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Berger & Udell, 1995). According with the mainstream
literature SMEs that have stronger relations (i.e, long relation, working with fewer
banks) with their financial intermediaries experience better credit conditions than
those who have weaker relations (Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Hernández-Cánovas &
Martínez-Solano, 2010). With respect to the costs, there is very different evidence
regarding the US and European small firms. In the US case, SMEswith a stronger re-
lationship tend to have a lower interest rate than those who have a less concentrated
relationship with banks (Berger & Udell, 1995; Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Hernández-
Cánovas & Martínez-Solano, 2010). In the case of the European SMEs, empirical
evidence showed that firms with a stronger relationship may have higher interest
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rates than firms with weaker relationships. We may conclude that the empirical ev-
idence suggests that firms in the continental European financial system that reduce
the number of relations or that increase the duration of the relation might confer
to the bank a monopoly power and the ability to extract rents from the company.
However, if the companies try to weaken the relation in order to reduce the banks
monopoly, the empirical evidence suggests that grating loans is less attractive to the
bank (Hernández-Cánovas & Martínez-Solano, 2010).
In summary, relationship lending is an information-intensive type of debt fi-
nancing which can affect the cost and the availability of credit in a particular way. It
is based in the idea of inter temporal implicit contract which is facilitated by a certain
degree of (ex post) bargaining power of the lender (Elsas & Krahnen, 1998).
2.5 Determinants of capital structure and financing de-
cisions of SMEs
Capital structure represents a permanent source of financing in the form of retained
earnings, long-term debt and equity. The perusal of the literature related to capital
structure reveals many implicit and explicit facts about the financing decisionsmade
by firms in general. According with Kumar (2015) the determinants of capital struc-
ture are either qualitative and quantitative. However, the problem accessing finance
can not be explained based on determinants of capital structure alone. It requires
an assessment of existing and target capital structure. Existing capital structure re-
flects the present choice of financing decisions of a firm, and target capital structure
represents all the available financing source in the market. If the existing and prefer-
able capital structure are the same the firm has overcome the problem associated
with inadequate and timely supply of financing. However, the main literature has
showed that there is a significant gap between the existing capital structure and the
preferable one in SMEs (Kumar & Rao, 2015).
Modigliani and Miller (1958) paper provides the basic foundation of capital
structure theories. Their paper shows that under perfect market conditions, capital
structure does not affect the value of a firm. This unrealistic assumption compel
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researchers to rethink on the importance of financing decisions with respect to firm’s
value. This gave rise to the development of alternative theories of capital structure.
Two of the most important new theories are the Trade-off, the Pecking order and the
agency cost theory (Serrasqueiro, Matias, & Salsa, 2016).
The trade-off theory assumes that firms have a target debt level which will
correspond to a optimal capital structure that maximises the advantages of debt
tax-shields and minimises bankruptcy costs, if this where the cases companies with
a higher debt to value ratio should have a higher debt than firms with a lower debt
to value ratio. In other words, it is supposed to firms to substitute equity for debt
and debt for equity until they maximise the value of the firm. According with
Myers (2001) the trade-off theory explains only moderated debt ratios, the theory
defends that a a company will continue to borrow where the marginal value of tax
shields on additional debt offsets the increase of the current market value of the firm
(Myers, 2001). When analysing the trade-off theory many authors notice that this
theory is in trouble in the tax front. This problem occurs because the theory rules
out conservative debt ratios by taxpaying firm. In other words, the theory cannot
explain why the most valuable companies in the world are also the ones with the
lowest debt ratios, Microsoft as an example. This idea is strongly supported by the
literature and the empirical evidence, once, according with Myers (1984) the most
profitable firms in a given industry tend to borrow the least (Myers, 1984, 2001; Rajan
& Zingales, 1995).
According to the pecking order theory, firms chose to finance their investment
project according with the financing costs. This means that a first firms will choose
to finance their projects with the lower cost of capital possible, in second with the
second lower cost of capital and sowone. In otherwords, a company firstwill finance
an investment project with their own internal funds, second they will adjust the div-
idends payout ration to their investment opportunities, third a firm will adjust their
marketable securities. If all this measures are not enough firmsmust turn to external
financing. Regarding this type of financing first managers will choose the safest type
of security and if it is not enough they will move risky securities. However, this
theory can be quickly reject if we require it to explain everything. However, recent
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work based on asymmetry of information gives predictions roughly in line with the
pecking order theory. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, based on asymmetric in-
formation and management acting in the interest of older stockholders may explain
several aspects of corporate behaviour. Including the order of preferences in which
a firm chooses to get their funds to finance an investment project. Since we are in
the presence of asymmetric information, the firm will follow a financial hierarchy of
information knowledge while financing investments.
Myers and Majluf (1984) explain the pecking order theory with asymmetric
information with resource to the followingmodel. They assume that a a firms issues
stocks that a are with N, however managers know that they ar worth N1, where N1 is
the value of the firm when, everything else constant, investors adquire the manager
special knowledge. Manager work to maximize the true value of the company. Lets
define δN as the amount that a the shares are over or undervalued, where
∆N = N1 − N
The manager will issue and invest if
y ≥ ∆N
Where y represents the NPV of the investment project. If in one hand the manager’s
issued unfavourable information, ∆N is negative and the firm will alway issue (zero
NPV project). On the other hand, if the manager issues favourable information the
firm ay pass a positiveNPV investment opportunity rather than issuing undervalued
shares. If manager act according with the two previous condition the decision to
issue will signal bad news for shareholders. Now lets define V as the market value
of the company and V′ as the value of the company with the new issue shares. If the
manager acts according with the inequity we must conclude that
V = E(x |No issue) = E(x |y ≤ ∆N)
where x is the value of the firm if the investment project is passed by,
V′ = E(x + y + N|issue) = E(x + y + N|y ≥ ∆N)
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The total amount is fixed by assumption. But, the number of new shares is not. Thus,
∆N is endogenous, it depends on V′. For example, is the firm issues, the fraction
of all shares held by new stockholders is N/V′. The manager sees the true value of




(x + y + N)
Thus, given N, x and y and given the stocks is issued, the greater the price per share,
the less value is given to new shareholder, and the less ∆N is. With the previous
model Myers and Majluf (1984) gave two implications of their model. The first one
is that, due to asymmetric information there is a possibility for manager to not issue
equity and pass up a positive NPV investment project. This cost can be avoided if the
firm retain enough internal cash-flow to cover the project. The second implication is
that if a firm chooses to seek external funding is better off issuing debt than equity.
This model assumes that new shares or risky debt would be underpriced. This mean
that, if the risky security is overpriced equity or other risky security seems to be better
than debt. However, if investors knows that managers will only issue equity when
its overpriced investors will only buy it when the firm has already exhausted its debt
capacity, that is, unless the firm has issued so much debt already that it would face
substancial additional costs in issuing more. Thus investors would effectively force
the firm to follow the pecking order (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Kumar & Rao, 2015).
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2.6 Theoretical Model
Hypothesis and Proposed Model
According with Myers and Majluf (1984) on the existence of asymmetric infor-
mation between shareholder and managers, there are two main factors that affects
the capital structure of a firm. The first one is that firms prefer to pass by god invest-
ment opportunities instead of issuing undervalued shares. The second effect is that
managers will only issue stocks when they are overvalued. However, if managers
act according to the previous idea, shareholders will only buy shares when the firm
has already exhausted its debt capacity (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Jensen
& Meckling, 1976).
Since our analysis is based on Portuguese SMEs we need to have in consider-
ation that banks are the main source of financing to most of the SMEs. Despite
the lower credit requirements by banks, information asymmetry is the biggest prob-
lem associated with the financing of small firms. Due to the lack of information
banks need to rely on soft information in order to finance SMEs projects. The most
common type of soft information available to bank is the relationship between the
bank and the manager-owner of the firm. Those two phenomenons, asymmetry of
information and banking financing requires, make relationship lending a big player
in the financing of SMEs, once it removes the problem of asymmetric information
(Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Berger & Udell, 1995; Kumar & Rao, 2015).
Relationship lending implies the existence of specific information of the bor-
rower only available to him and the lender. This phenomenon encourages the
entrepreneur to transmit valuable strategic information and it will also encourage
the bank to carry out costly monitoringwork. Due to this increase of information the
bank knowledge of the firm will also increase, making it less risky to lend money. A
consequence of relationship lending is the increase of the availability of credit and
the decrease of the costs of capital (Diamond, 1984; Bhattacharya & Chiesa, 1995;
Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Boot, 2000; Hernández-Cánovas & Martínez-Solano, 2010).
However, Sharpe (1990) argues that due to the asymmetric evolution of the infor-
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mation between the lender and the other banks there is a reduction of the flexibility
of the firm to leave the relationship and provides the bank with monopoly power,
which as threemain effects. The first one Sharpe argues that financial intermediaries
withmonopoly powerwill offer uncompetitive conditions hence obtainedmonopoly
rent. Second, the firms reduced flexibility to change lenders will increase the incen-
tives of lender to invest in monitoring. Third, the reduced competition allows banks
to extract returns in the long term to offset initial losses arising from granting loans
to small firms (Sharpe, 1990; Hernández-Cánovas & Martínez-Solano, 2010).
The main literature profitability, age, size, tangibility and growth as the major
factors affecting the capital structure of SMEs. The effect of these factors has been
analysed based on the leverage of SMEs. Most of mainstream literature states that
most of the SMEs in developing countries dependent on short-term debt. Depen-
dence on short-term debt has revealed the existence of an under-developed capital
market and the absence or reluctance of financial institutions in providing finance
to SMEs in developing countries. Thus, this argument also supports the problem of
access to finance for SMEs. Profitability provides stability in earnings, and due to
risk-aversive nature of SMEs, less preference is given to external funding. Inaccessi-
bility of long-term debt for SMEs also indicates the lack of collateral to mortgage in
lieu of long-term loans. It also justifies the positive relationship between long-term
debt and asset structure. Since, SMEs are risky ventures, they have to provide collat-
eral for taking long-term loans from banks and other financial institutions. However,
short-term debt is inversely related with asset structure due to the inability of SMEs
to provide valuable collateral for raising external funds. Debt overhang is a major
issue encountered when financing the investment to boost growth. Growth makes
pressure on earnings and pushes SMEs owner-managers to take more long-term
debt. However, in order to avoid a conflict between owner-manager and lender
(asymmetric information), firms prefer to finance high growth investment with their
own funds instead debt (Myers &Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984; Titman&Wessels, 1988;
Myers, 2001; Kumar & Rao, 2015).
With our model the main objective is to understand how relationship lending
affects the capital structure of Portuguese SMEs.
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Data and Methodology
Sincewe are interested in understandingwhat is the impact of relationship lending in
the leverage level of a firm we will use the truncated regression model to determine
the coefficient of the independent variables. However, our analysis will not stop
here. We also want to understand how did the 2007 financial crisis affect the relation
between banks and the leverage level of a firm. To do so, we collected data from
Portuguese SMEs before, during and after the financial crisis.
3.1 Methodology
We will now describe the models that we use to analyse the effects of relationship
banking in the capital structure of Portuguese SMEs.
The model
We will estimate two models, in both models the sample is truncated at zero,
since a firm can not have a leverage1 inferior to zero. To estimate the model we
need a linear regression model that takes into account the fact that the sample is
truncated in a point. In our case a left truncation at the leverage level equal to zero.
With a truncated dependent variable we need to be concerned with inferring the
characteristics of a full population from a sample drawn of a restricted part of the
1Leverage is the use of various financial instruments or borrowed capital to increase the potential
return of an investment
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population. The best model to estimate such regression is the truncated.
Our linear regression models are:
Levi = β0 + β1Coni + β2Sizei + β4Age+ β5Asset structi + β6Profi + β7Empl.i + µi
(3.1)
Levi = β0 + β1DiNOBi + β2Sizei + β4Age+ β5Asset structi + β6Profi + β7Empl.i + εi
(3.2)
With model 3.1 we expect to find out if a higher number of relations with banks
(lower relationship banking) has a positive or a negative impact in the capital struc-
ture of SMEs, and if this impact is statistically significant. In model 3.2 our main
objective is to find out if there is a statically significant difference between SMEs that
work with only one bank (higher relationship banking) and SMEs that work with
several banks.
Variables
In our review of literature we have find that, according with the main theories
of capital structure, there are few variables that influence in the financing decisions
of SMEs. The variables that we will use are define in table 3.1
Table 3.1: Variables definition
Variables Definition
Leverage (Levi) Total Debt / Total Assets
Concentration (Coni) ln(1 +Number of relations relations)
Number of banks (DiNOBi) Dummy variable taking value 1 when firm works
with one bank and 0 otherwise
Size (Sizei) ln(Turnover)
Age (Agei) ln(1 +Number of years of the firm)
Asset structure (A.structi) Tangible Assets / Total Assets
Profitability (Pro fi) EBIT/Total Assets
Employees (Empl.i) ln(Number of employees)
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Leverage (levi) will measure the capital structure of firm i and it will be our
dependent variable. With regard to the independent variables we want manly to
understand what is the impact of relationship lending in the financial structure of
Portuguese SMEs. In order to do the analyses, the main independent variables
that we will use is one that examines the effects of banking relation in the capital
structure of afirm. Accordingwith the literature,we expect that if a firm increases the
number of relations their information will be less valuable to the bank, making less
attractive to lend money. A good proxy for relationship lending is the concentration
of banks that work with a firm, which may be measure as the natural logarithm of
the number of banks (NORi) with which the firm works ln(NORi). We will also
want to analyse what is the difference between a firm having one or more banks.
In order to do so, we will use a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm
works with 1 bank and 0 otherwise. With respect to profitability, in one hand
the trade-off theory argues that profitability is positively related to indebtedness.
The most profitable firms have greater debt capacity, and take advantage of debt
tax-shields. They also have another advantage, since the most profitable firms are
probably more able to fulfil their responsibilities regarding to debt. On the other
hand, the pecking-order theory argues that firms will invest internal funds (profits)
in their own projects first. They only move to external funds if and only if the
internal funding is insufficient. Additionally, they prefer debt over equity. This
implies that according to the pecking-order theory profitability may be negatively
related to indebtedness (Hernández-Cánovas &Martínez-Solano, 2010; Serrasqueiro
et al., 2016; Pacheco & Tavares, 2015). According to the Trade-off theory there is a
positive relationship between asset structure and indebtedness, where the greater
the tangible asset value the greater the indebtedness level, because those act as
collateral in case the firm enters a bankruptcy process. The existence of collateral
reduces agency costs and the problems of information asymmetry. Pecking Order
theory also predicts a positive association, because firms which have collateral make
their creditors feel more comfortable financing their investments and their financial
costs are also lower (Myers, 1984; Hernández-Cánovas & Martínez-Solano, 2010;
Serrasqueiro et al., 2016; Pacheco & Tavares, 2015). Regarding size, the literature
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argues that asymmetric information andmoral hazard problems are greater in small
firms due to the lack of financial disclosure and their owner-manager nature. These
two problems combinewith a low value of assets to grant their capacity to pay off the
debt and interest and a lowdiversification, whichwill imply a higher risk for creditor,
will result in a positive relation between size and indebtedness (Hernández-Cánovas
& Martínez-Solano, 2010; Serrasqueiro et al., 2016; Pacheco & Tavares, 2015). With
respect to age, according with Peterson and Rajan (1994) young firms tend to have
a a higher leverage ratio than more mature firms. Firms that come from survival
phases successfully tend to retain more earning than younger firms. Relatively
to Portuguese SMEs and according with the literature there is a positive relation
between age and leverage (Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Ramalho & da Silva, 2009; Matias
& Serrasqueiro, 2017).
3.2 Data
In order to analyse the relationship between relationship lending and the capital
structure decision of firms we collected the data from a cross-section sample con-
taining 5, 000 Portuguese SMEs with a turnover less than EUR 50million, total assets
smaller than EUR 43 million and with less than 250 employees. Regarding the data
before the financial crisis the year that we choose was 2006 because it is the last year
before the subprime, after cleaning our sample we end up with 3, 090 observations.
With respect to the data during the financial crisis we choose the year of 2008 because
it is the year when Lehman Brothers bankrupted, after cleaning the data we end up
with 3, 146 observations. Finally, for the data after the financial crisis we choose the
year of 2015 because it is the last year available, after cleaning our sample we end up
with 3, 139 observations. The data was collected from SABI database.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of the pre financial crisis data*
Variables Mean Median Stand. Dev. Min. Max.
Leverage 0.1474 0.1105 0.1390 0.0000 1.7856
Concentration 1.4110 1.3863 0.3892 0.6931 2.5649
Number of Banks 0.8825 1.0000 0.3220 0.0000 1.0000
Size 8.9423 8.9852 0.8708 3.0637 10.8095
Age 2.8482 2.9115 0.7421 0.0790 4.6828
Asset Structure 0.2595 0.2213 0.1979 0.0000 0.9739
Profitability 0.0505 0.0434 0.1010 −1.7095 1.0138
Employees 63.2097 46.0000 54.3164 1.0000 250.000
* The statistics presented are computed across 3, 090 observations.
Before the financial crises the median firms in the data had a leverage of 11.05%,
an average of 17.38 years old, a turnover of EUR 7, 983.81 thousand, 22.13% of the
total assets are tangible assets, a profitability over assets of 4.34%, works with more
than one bank (more specifically 3 banks) and 46 employees.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of the financial crisis data*
Variables Mean Median Stand. Dev. Min. Max.
Leverage 0.1506 0.1160 0.1383 0.0000 1.2936
Concentration 1.3991 1.3863 0.3954 0.6931 2.5649
Number of Banks 0.8709 1.0000 0.3353 0.0000 1.0000
Size 9.0776 9.1014 0.8598 0.1287 10.8184
Age 2.9255 2.9797 0.6990 0.4422 4.7011
Asset Structure 0.2571 0.2126 0.1991 0.0000 0.9734
Profitability 0.0493 0.0458 0.0996 −1.9114 0.8413
Employees 65.2505 48.0000 55.6844 1.0000 250.000
* The statistics presented are computed across 3, 146 observations.
During the financial crisis themedian firms in the data had a leverage of 11.60%,
an average of 18.68 years old, a turnover of EUR 8, 967.73 thousand, 21.26% of the
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total assets are tangible assets, a profitability over assets of 4.58%, works with more
then one bank (more specifically 3 banks) and 48 employees.
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics of the post financial crisis data*
Variables Mean Median Stand. Dev. Min. Max.
Leverage 0.1443 0.0973 0.2311 0.0000 8.1276
Concentration 0.7075 0.6931 0.1129 0.6931 2.1972
Number of Banks 0.0182 0.0000 0.1335 0.0000 1.0000
Size 9.2950 9.1835 0.5381 8.5962 10.8144
Age 3.2545 3.2695 0.5320 0.8437 4.7622
Asset Structure 0.2363 0.1956 0.1810 0.0000 0.9747
Profitability 0.0613 0.0486 0.1195 −3.6042 2.4346
Employees 70.3265 53.0000 54.9248 1.0000 250.000
* The statistics presented are computed across 3, 139 observations.
After the crisis the median firms in the data had a leverage of 9.73%, an average
of 25.30 years old, a turnover of EUR 9, 734.98, 19.56% of the total assets are tan-
gible assets, a profitability over assets is 4.86%, only works with one bank and 53
employees.




Our preliminary analysis will be focused first in the analysis of the relation between
the leverage level and the concentration of banks, and secondly in figuring if working
with only one bank has a significant difference in the leverage than working with
more than one bank. For the first analysis, we plotted a graphic were in the vertical
axis we have the leverage level of a firm and in the horizontal axis we have the
concentration1 of financial intermediaries that work with the enterprise. Regarding
the second analysis ourmain goal is to understand ifworkingwith only one bank has
any impact in the leverage level of Portuguese SMEs. In order to do the preliminary
analysis of this model we will compare, in a table, the average level of leverage when
a firm works with only one or with more than one bank. In both models we will
look at the data in four different samples. Three of them represent the three points
in time (before, during and after the crisis) the last one is the total sample.
1see table 3.1 for the definition of concentration
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Figure 4.1: Preliminary analysis of the impact of relationship lending in the capital
structure of SMEs in Portugal
(a) Before the financial crisis (b) During the financial crisis
(c) After the financial crisis (d) Total Sample
In our first preliminary analysis we may conclude that before and during the
financial crisis there was a positive relation between the concentration of banks and
the leverage level of the firms, an evidence of a lower relationship lending. However,
when we analyse the same plot for the data after the financial crisis we see that in-
stead of a positive relationwe have a slightly negative relation between the number of
banks and the leverage level of a company, evidence of a higher relationship lending.
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Before the Crisis During the Crisis After the Crisis Total Sample
Mean Frequency Mean Frequency Mean Frequency Mean Frequency
One 0.1417 363 0.1454 406 0.1447 3, 082 0.1445 3, 851
More than One 0.1481 2, 727 0.1514 2, 740 0.1210 57 0.1495 5, 524
Total 0.1474 3, 090 0.1506 3, 146 0.1443 3, 139 0.1474 9, 375
In our second preliminary analysis we may conclude that before and during the
crisis a firm that works with more than one bank (less relationship lending) has a
higher leverage level than a firm that works with only one bank. However, in table
4.1 wemay conclude that, after the crisis, firms that only works with one bank (more
relationship lending) have higher leverage than others firms.
4.2 Empirical Results
In this subchapter we will present the results of the estimation model of the various
samples in order to better understand how does the relationship lending relate with
the leverage of a company. As we have seen before, we will use a truncated regres-
sion model to estimate the coefficients and the marginal effects of the independent
variables in the dependent one. The results of the estimation are presented in the
next page.
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By analysing table 4.2 we conclude that in both models, before and during the
crisis, there was a positive relation between the number of banks and the leverage
of a firm. This phenomenon indicates that there is a negative relation between
relationship lending and the leverage of a firm. However, if we analyse the period
after the financial crisis we conclude that there is a negative relation between the
number of banks and the leverage of a firms. This may indicate that, after the
financial crisis, banks started to lend only to firms with which they already had a
relation. In other words, there is evidence of a strong relation between relationship
banking and the leverage of a firm.
However, the coefficients of model 3.1 after the crisis and all of the models 3.2
are not statistically significant. In other words, they may be consider equal to zero.
All of ours six models were globally significant at one per cent.
The hypothesis tested in our model is the following:
H0 : Variable = 0
H1 : Variable 6= 0
However, regardingmodel 3.1 there is some statistical evidence that relationship
lending may have some impact in the leverage level of a firm. We will divide our
analyse in each of the regression made (before, during and after the financial crisis).
First lets interpret the results of the regressionmadewith the data retrieve before and
during the financial crisis, since they have the same signals. In these sampleswemay
conclude that the concentration of banks has a positive impact in the leverage level
of a bank, this means that when the number of banks increases (less relationship)
the leverage level of a firm will also increase. With respect to the size of a firm,
we conclude that there is a positive relation with the leverage of the firm, in other
words, when the turnover of a firm increase the leverage level of a firm will also
increase. Regarding the age there is no statistical evidence that there is no impact in
the leverage of a firm. When we analyse the asset structure of a firmwe find out that
there is a negative relation between the asset structure of a firm and their leverage
level, this means that when the number of fixed assets increase the leverage level will
decrease. Regarding the profitability of a firm we find out that there is a negative
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relation between the profitability of a firm and their leverage level, this means that
when the number of fixed assets increase the leverage level will decrease. Finally
we analyse the results of the model after the financial crisis. In this sample we may
conclude that the concentration of banks has a negative impact in the leverage level
of a bank. This means that when the number of banks increases (less relationship)
the leverage level of a firm will decrease. However, in this sample the concentration
of banks is not statistically significant. In other words, there is no relation between
the two. With respect to the size of a firmwe conclude that there is a positive relation
with the leverage of the firm, in other words, when the turnover of a firm increase
the leverage level of a firm will also increase. Regarding the age, there is a negative
relation between the age of a firm and the leverage, this means that when a firms
gets older the leverage level will decrease. With respect to the asset structure of a
firm there is no statistical evidence that there is no impact in the leverage of a firm.
Regarding the profitability of a firm we find out that there is a negative relation
between the profitability of a firm and their leverage level, this means that when the
number of fixed assets increase the leverage level will decrease.
If we look at model 3.2 we can conclude that the coefficients follow the same
path as in model 3.1. However in this case, all the coefficients are not statistically
significant. This means that the difference between working with one bank or work
with more than one bank has no influence in the financing decision of a SME.
However, if we do the same test but instead of limiting our dummy variable at one
bank we limited at two banks, all the models 3.2 will react in the same way as model
3.1. Thismeans that, before and during the crises there is positive difference between
working with only one bank or working with more than one, which goes according
with model 3.1. However if we look at the period after the financial crisis we notice
that the difference, although negative, is not statically significant.
One probable cause of the results showed in table 4.2 is that firm increase their
leverage level not because they needed but because there was an excess supply of
money from the financial system.
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Conclusion
With this master final workwewhere searching an answer to the following question:
What is the impact of relationship lending in financing and capital structure decisions on
SMEs in Portugal? In order to do so we have collected financial data from three
different periods of time of Portuguese SMEs (before, during and after the financial
crisis) and computed two regression model that may explain the impact of relation-
ship lending i the capital structure of a firm. The first regression tries to explain the
impact of the number of banks in the leverage level of a firm and the second one
try to explain if there is a difference in the leverage level if a firm works with one or
more banks.
From our estimations we found that before and during the financial crisis the
impact of the number of banks is positive in the leverage level. However, if we
look to the period after the financial crisis we can see tat although the result of the
estimation is negative it is not statistically significant when firms determine their
leverage level.
In conclusion, our empirical results show that, in Portugal SMEs with a stronger
relationship do not have necessarily a higher availability of credit. Instead our result
shows that SMEs with weaker relations have a higher leverage levels. Our results go
against the main theory in relationship banking and capital structure.
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